MEXICO CERTIFICATION DISAPPROVAL LEGISLATION
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, for the next few minutes I will make limited remarks prior to the introduction of two separate joint resolutions that deal with the administration's recent certification of Mexico dealing with the losing drug war, and that deal, in my judgment, was a more appropriate approach to this situation.
Mr. President, I consider myself as a person somewhat surprised by the New York Times editorial of Saturday, February 28, 1998; the headline of the editorial, `Certifiably Wrong On Mexico.'
The Clinton administration does no favor to Mexico or its own credibility by certifying that Mexico is `fully cooperating' in the fight against drug trafficking. Compounding the damage, the White House Drug Policy Director, Barry McCaffrey, fatuously claims that Mexican cooperation is `absolutely superlative.'
According to this editorial, A more truthful assessment can be found in the Drug Enforcement Administration's confidential evaluation, described by Tim Golden in yesterday's Times. The DEA concludes that `the Government of Mexico has not accomplished its counter-narcotic goals or succeeded in cooperation with the U.S. Government.' Mexican trafficking has increased, the DEA notes, and the corruption of its enforcement agencies `continues unabated.'
Though Washington finds it diplomatically inconvenient to acknowledge, Mexico has a chronic problem with drug traffickers who always seem to be able to secure the political influence they need to avoid arrest and prosecution. This drug corruption greases the flow of narcotics into the United States. Mexico's drug networks span the border, supplying cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to American users.
Mr. President, in a hearing last week, I indicated, along with Senator Feinstein of California, that we would be introducing resolutions, the purpose of which would be to change this course between the United States and Mexico on this matter. It would be our goal that the process would decertify Mexico on this matter with a Presidential waiver in the national interest in which I believe we both concur. This would be an honest appraisal of our circumstances.
The problem with certifying is that it sends a message to the vast populations of the United States and of Mexico that this war is being won, that we have turned a corner, that things are working out. That simply is not the case. I think it does a disservice to the entire population of both countries for us to send a message of victory when, indeed, the message is one of gravity and loss.
This situation has grave consequences for the people of the United States. I have to say that the United States shares enormous responsibility in this struggle. My remarks are not intended to castigate or single out Mexico; quite to the contrary; I view them as a great ally. They are a great trading partner. We share this hemisphere. We have mutual goals--democratic goals. But neither country seems to want to face the fact that it is losing a precious struggle.
In 1991, the drug interdiction budget for the United States was $2.03 billion; today it is $1.44 billion. That is a dramatic reduction in our commitment. In 1992, the United States stopped, seized 440 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana a day; in 1995, it had been cut in half; we only stopped 205 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana per day.
What does this all mean? In shorthand, it means that about 3 million teenagers aged 12-16 are using drugs today that weren't in 1991. To give an example, in 1991, 400,000 eighth-graders had used an illicit drug in the last year. In 1996 and 1997, that number rose to 920,000. In 10th grade, 600,000 had used a drug in 1991; in 1996 and 1997, it had doubled to 1.2 million children. In 12th grade, 600,000 in 1991; 1.1 million, almost doubled again, in 1996 and 1997.
So by not confronting this directly and honesty, we are all contributing to the accelerated rate of children using drugs and we are going to pay a price for this the likes of which we have never seen.
I will yield to the Senator from California in just a moment, but
first I quote a story of a top administrative official on this. It
ran in the Phoenix papers.
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`Our current interdiction efforts almost completely fail to achieve
our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and
methamphetamines across the (Southwest) [the Mexican]
border,' said Francis X. Kinney, director of strategic planning for
the Office of National Drug Control Policy. . . .
Kinney said the United States will continue to be overrun by drug traffic at the U.S.-Mexican border unless it emphasizes improved intelligence and high-tech screening equipment. . .
The last thing he said addresses the Senator from California:
`They [the Congress] want us to call it like it is, not to be
an apologist,' alluding to the U.S. Congress.
I think this gentleman is absolutely correct.
Mr. President, I send a joint resolution to the desk and ask for its appropriate referral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred.
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I send another joint resolution to the desk and ask for its appropriate referral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred. Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, in concluding and yielding to the Senator from California, I just want to make it clear that the purpose of these two joint resolutions is to alter the course of our engagement in the drug war, principally as it relates to Mexico.
Instead of certifying and saying, `Here is a message of victory to the two peoples of the two Nations,' it decertifies with a national security waiver and calls it like it is and refocuses our Governments and our people in a combined effort to win this battle and not lose it--to win it for the millions of children that are suffering, because we are losing it.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Georgia, and I rise to join him in submitting these resolutions for disapproval of the President's decision to certify Mexico as fully cooperating with the United States in the fight against drug trafficking.
Mr. President, as we all know, when the President made the same decision last year, it sparked an intense debate between the administration and what was in all probability a majority of Congress who did not believe that Mexico had earned certification. I have looked long and hard at the evidence that is available. I have received extensive briefings from law enforcement and intelligence officials. Anyone, I believe, who has received these same briefings would come to the conclusion I have reached, that once again the decision to certify Mexico is incorrect and not grounded in the facts.
While Mexico has made some limited progress, there remain gaping holes in its counternarcotics effort. Whether due to inability or lack of political will, these failures badly undermine the urgent effort to keep the scourge of drugs off our streets. Regardless of America's demand problem, when the supply of drugs reaches the point where it comes in at literally tons each day, any demand program is extraordinarily difficult to sustain.
Has Mexico cooperated in some areas? Of course. There are one or two new police units which seem to have trusting relationships with the DEA. New vetting procedures are beginning to be implemented in the hiring of new police officers. Mexico and the United States have agreed on a bilateral drug strategy, although it is a vaguely worded document that will take years to evaluate whether it has been successful and whether actions on the streets will follow this roundtable document.
It can also be argued that pressure brought to bear on drug lord Amado Carrillo-Fuentes was responsible for driving him to seek refuge in another country--Chile--and very likely for his attempt to conceal his identity through plastic surgery. The surgery, of course, resulted in his death and the torture-murder of the entire surgical team. His organization, however, continues to operate, and a reign of violence has been unleashed as his would-be successors battle for control of his organization.
But last year, Senator Coverdell and I laid out a number of key areas that we would use to judge whether or not Mexico has reached the standard of full cooperation. Sadly, our top law enforcement agencies indicate that none of these changes has produced significant results. There has been no demonstrable action on any--and I repeat `any'--of the benchmarks outlined by Congress last year as key measurements of cooperation by Mexico: dismantlement of drug cartels, the arrest and prosecution of cartel leaders, the extradition of Mexican nationals on drug charges to the United States for prosecution, effective prosecution of corrupt officials, law enforcement cooperation, effective money laundering laws implemented, security of U.S. drug agents working in bilateral efforts in Mexico.
Let me touch on each of these. The cartels in Mexico today are either as strong or stronger than they were a year ago. And despite much talk of cooperation, there has been no substantial progress by the Government of Mexico in developing prosecutable cases against the leaders of the major drug trafficking groups, even when these individuals have been identified by U.S. investigations and are made the subject of U.S. indictments.
The scope of Mexican drug trafficking has increased significantly, along with the attendant violence, even against United States and Mexican law enforcement officials and informants.
During 1997, DEA recorded in excess of 50 incidents of threats along the Southwest border. According to the information I have received, the Mexican Government has arrested and prosecuted few individuals in connection with these acts. None of the major cartels has been dismantled nor have their leaders been arrested.
Take the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization. After the death of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, there were numerous enforcement actions taken against his organization, but the intelligence was unproductive, leading to insignificant asset seizures and new arrests.
On July 30, 1997, Mexican authorities detained a close associate of Carrillo-Fuentes, Manuel Bitar-Tafich, leading to seizure of $50 million in the United States. However, because the Mexicans have not provided the needed documents to support the seizure in the United States, much of the money had to be returned. Bitar himself remains in custody, but there has been no movement on his case. While the Mexicans have reported seizing $52 million in Mexico, no documentation supporting this seizure has been provided to the U.S. Government.
The Mexican Government arrested Noe Brito, a member of Carrillo-Fuentes' security apparatus. He was released, however, before the DEA was even allowed to interview him.
The Arellano-Felix operation--the notorious cartel located just south of California in the Tijuana area--continues to operate with impunity. There have been several enforcement actions in 1997, but few resulted in significant results against the cartel's trafficking operations.
On November 8, 1997, the Mexican Attorney General's Office arrested Arturo Everardo Paez-Martinez, a known cartel assassin.
Paez is incarcerated in Mexico on the basis of a provisional U.S. arrest warrant but has not been extradited.
On September 20, Mexico's counternarcotics unit reporting to the Attorney General arrested two men on weapons charges, who are known members of the `Juniors,' a group of young assassins recruited by the Arellano-Felix cartel. The Government of Mexico offered to extradite one of the men, but the United States had to turn down the offer due to lack of outstanding charges and evidence against him. This is an example of what results from a lack of cooperative law enforcement efforts.
The Sonora Cartel. Miguel Angel Caro-Quintero heads his family's organization operating out of Sonora, Mexico. There are four outstanding warrants for him on smuggling, RICO statute, and conspiracy charges. He has been operating freely in Mexico since 1992. There are also provisional arrest warrants issued for both Miguel and Rafael Caro-Quintero.
The Amezcua-Contreras brothers. The Amezcua-Contreras brothers' organization is believed to be the world's largest clandestine producer of methamphetamine. The organization procures huge quantities of the ephedrine in Thailand and India, which is supplied to laboratories in Mexico and California. The Amezcuas' methamphetamine is distributed in large cities across the United States.
A U.S. law enforcement investigation, Operation META, concluded in December of 1997 with the arrest of 101 defendants, seizure of 133 pounds of methamphetamine, and the precursors to manufacture up to 540 pounds more, along with 1,100 kilos of cocaine and over $2.25 million in assets.
Mexican efforts against this organization have not met with great
success:
On November 10, 1997, the Mexican military's special vetted unit
arrested Adan Amezcua at his ranch in Colima on gun charges, not on
drug charges. He is the only Amezcua not under indictment in either
the United States or Mexico. He remains in custody pending further
investigations. The Government of Mexico has failed to indict or
arrest any of the principal members of the Amezcua organization in
Mexico.
The DEA International Chemical Control Unit has supported elements of the Government of Mexico financially and logistically for numerous investigations of the Amezcuas, with little or no results. None of the investigations resulted in arrests or produced information that could be used in U.S. courts.
Though Jesus and Luis Amezcua are currently under Federal indictment in the United States on a variety of charges, there are no provisional arrest warrants for them and they remain at large in Mexico.
Extradition was a key benchmark and a test of cooperation. There have been no extraditions from Mexico to the United States of any Mexican nationals on drug charges--none.
The identities of the leaders of the major criminal groups based in Mexico who control the flow of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine to the United States have been known for several years. In fact, U.S. law enforcement agencies have built cases on and indicted in the United States virtually all of these cartel leaders. The Department of Justice has filed provisional arrest warrants for the most significant drug traffickers in Mexico. While several have been arrested, many others remain at large and none has been extradited to the United States.
In the war against drugs, extradition of cartel leaders for trial and imprisonment in the United States is a key and indisputable beachhead in the war against drug trafficking. It is also a major benchmark of cooperation.
In my view--and I know the view held by law enforcement in the United States--the drug lords operating in Mexico only fear extradition to the United States, where they know they will stand trial and face punishment commensurate with their crimes. The Mexican law enforcement institutions and legal system present no deterrent to their operations.
That is why this Senate, many of my colleagues, and law enforcement officials have repeatedly said that the most meaningful measurement of real progress in drug cooperation with Mexico is if the major traffickers are apprehended and extradited to the United States.
Provisional arrest warrants have been filed by the Department of
Justice for the following major traffickers:
Agustin Vasquez-Mendoza, Ramon Arellano-Felix, Rafael Caro-Quintero,
Miguel Caro-Quintero, Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes, Eduardo
Gonzalez-Quirarte, Oscar Malherbe, Arturo Paez-Martinez, Jaime
Ladino-Avila, Jose Gerardo-Castro/Gonzalez-Gutierez, William Brian
Martin, Miguel Angel Martinez-Martinez, Antonio Hernandez-Acosta, and
Miguel Felix Gallardo.
These are all key lieutenants in either the Amezcua, Carrillo-Fuentes, Caro-Quintero, or Arellano-Felix organizations. The Justice Department requested extradition of four of the above within the past year. The first two requests have been stalled or completely thwarted by Mexican courts.
Last November, the United States and Mexico Attorneys General signed a protocol to the United States-Mexican Extradition Treaty that authorized temporary surrender of a convicted party to the other country to face drug charges. This is certainly a positive signal, but it has yet to be tested in practice.
The bottom line is that, to date, there has not been a single extradition of a Mexican national to the United States on drug charges--not one.
Corruption. Drug-related corruption is probably the single greatest obstacle that the United States faces in its global battle against international drug trafficking. Unfortunately, drug corruption in Mexico is so deeply rooted that it persists despite attempts to eradicate it.
The level of drug corruption in Mexico continues unabated. According to the briefings I have received, virtually every investigation our law enforcement agencies conduct against major traffickers in Mexico uncovers significant corruption of law enforcement officials.
Our own law enforcement agencies indicate that endemic corruption among Mexican law enforcement officials continually frustrates our effort to build cases against and to apprehend the most significant drug traffickers in Mexico, and it is the primary reason there has been no meaningful progress in drug law enforcement in Mexico.
In the wake of the devastating disclosure that Mexico's own `drug czar' was on the payroll of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, the Mexican Government dismantled the INCD, the Mexican counterpart to the DEA, and fired the majority of its employees.
Unfortunately, many of those fired were ordered reinstated by Mexican courts.
Additionally, of the 40 military officers arrested as part of the Gutierrez-Rebollo investigation, none has been brought to trial or convicted to date.
The following cases indicate how deeply drug corruption has penetrated into Mexican institutions:
Colonel Jose Luis Rubalcava, who had been Director of the Federal Judicial Anti-Drug Police under the INCD, was arrested on or about April 14, 1997 on charges in connection with 2.5 tons of cocaine seized in Sombrete, Mexico in 1995. This is the director for the Judicial Anti-Drug Police--2 1/2 tons of cocaine.
U.S. law enforcement officials speculate that bribery and corruption may have been behind the withdrawal of Baja state police protection from a Tijuana news editor prior to his November 27, 1997 attempted assassination. The editor had been putting public pressure on the issue of drug corruption.
According to a December 1997 statement by Mexican Attorney General Madrazo, out of some 870 Federal agents dismissed on corruption charges in 1996, 700 have been rehired in either the PGR--the Mexican Attorney General's office--or at the state and local level. The rehiring was done at the direction of the courts.
If you cannot fire corrupt law enforcement officials, how can you fight drugs?
The issue of prosecuting corrupt officials is important, because without fear of prosecution, there is little deterrence. Too often in Mexico, officials are fired, but never prosecuted.
In 1997, there were only 3 corruption cases being prosecuted, including General Gutierrez. Another case involves the theft of 476 kilograms of cocaine by 17 PGR officials, including an Army General in Sonora. The third involved a Judicial Police Comandante. The Mexican government has reportedly begun additional prosecutions, but many more cases need to be brought to trial in order to have any deterrent effect.
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LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION
This is where the rubber hits the road in counternarcotics cooperation, not in agreements reached at the political level. Unfortunately, law enforcement cooperation from Mexico has been severely lacking.
It is encouraging to hear from DEA that there are now some Mexican officials with whom they believe they can build a trusting relationship.
A key aspect of this institution-building process is vetting, leading to the development and professionalization of the new drug enforcement unit, the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes Against Health.
This vetting process could go a long way toward providing U.S. law enforcement officials with the level of trust in their counterparts necessary for an effective bi-lateral effort, but it is still in its infancy, and even some officials who have been `vetted' have subsequently been arrested in connection with traffickers. So while this effort is critically important, it is not evidence of full cooperation by a long shot.
More telling however, is the state of affairs with the much-vaunted Bilateral Border Task Forces located in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez and Matamoros. Each Task Forces was supposed to include Mexican agents, and two agents each from DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service. But, regretfully, the Task Forces are not operational because some Mexican agents, and even comandantes, have been under suspicion of, or arrested for, ties to criminal organizations.
The old Task Forces were dismantled after the arrest of General Gutierrez-Rebollo and have been rebuilt since then. But the Mexican government for a long time did not provide the promised funding, leaving DEA to carry the full cost, which they did until September of last year.
Additionally, the issue of personal security for U.S. agents working with the Bilateral Task Forces in Mexico has not been resolved and, as a result, the task forces are not operational and will not be until the security issue is resolved.
The bottom line is that the task forces cannot function properly without DEA and other federal law enforcement agents working side by side with their Mexican counterparts, as is the case with similar units in Colombia and Peru. This critical joint working relationship is made impossible by Mexican policies that do not allow for adequate immunities or physical security for U.S. Special Agents while working in Mexico.
A related problem for the Task Forces is the low quality of intelligence provided by Mexico. To my knowledge there have been no meaningful intelligence leads from Mexican agents to their American counterparts leading to a single significant seizure of drugs coming into this country.
Intelligence sharing simply does not flow north.
U.S. law enforcement officials indicate that Mexico's drug intelligence facilities located near the Task Forces are manned by non-vetted, non-law enforcement civilians and military staff and have only produced leads from telephone intercepts on low-level traffickers. To date, none of the electronic intercepts conducted by the Task Forces have produced a prosecutable drug case in Mexican courts against any major Mexican criminal organization.
To its credit, the Organized Crime Unit does have several major on-going investigations underway. But only 140 of the planned 280 prosecutors, investigators and support personnel have been hired, and only 25 have been `super-vented.' Again, this unit is promising, but it is still too early to tell whether it will maintain the integrity, or have the staffing, training and resources to be effective partners in the war against drugs.
ENFORCEMENT
Mexico's seizures of cocaine have increased from 23.6 metric tons in
1996 to 34.9 metric tons in 1997--although that is still far below
the average of 45 metric tons in 1991-1993. Marijuana seizures did
reach an all-time high.
Unfortunately, seizures of heroin, methamphetamine, and ephedrine are all down sharply. Heroin seizures fell from 363 kilograms to 115 kilograms. Methamphetamine seizures fell from 172 kilograms to only 39 kilograms. Ephedrine seizures fell dramatically from 6,697 kilograms to only 608 kilograms.
Drug related arrests declined from an already low 11,283 to 10,622, barely a third of the number arrested in 1992. Less than half as many weapons were seized in 1997 (1,892) as in 1996 (4,335).
In another crucial enforcement area, Mexico's new money-laundering statutes have yet to be fully enforced, and have not resulted in any successful prosecutions yet. Mexico has decided to make violations of new banking regulations non-criminal violations, which severely undercuts the deterrent factor.
Mexico's Organized Crime Statute has yet to be fully implemented. The Government of Mexico has advised that the lack of judicial support and known judicial corruption have frustrated implementation of the wire intercept aspects of the law.
But let us be honest with ourselves. The statute asks the President to certify that a country has `cooperated fully' with the United States. If Mexico has cooperated in three or four areas, and not cooperated in ten or twelve others, can we really call that full cooperation. Of course not. At best, we should say that Mexico has cooperated partially with the United States in counternarcotics efforts. But full cooperation? It's not even close.
We must make an honest assessment. To those who dislike the certification statute, I quote again from the New York Times editorial `* * * as long as certification remains on the books, the Administration has a duty to report truthfully to Congress and the American people. It has failed to do so in the case of Mexico.'
So in the wake of the President's decision to certify Mexico, I believe we in Congress have no choice but to try to pass a resolution of disapproval. If possible, we will pass one with a waiver of sanctions. But if not, we will have to vote on the straight resolution of disapproval. We have until March 28 to decide.
Mr. President, we must make an honest assessment of full cooperation, and there is only one way to assess full cooperation, and it is on the streets. It is with extradition. It is with arrest of cartel leaders. It is with letting our DEA agents who work the Mexican side of the border have their security--meaning beyond. You cannot send them across the border without a mechanism to protect them. None of this is happening today.
The big, highly touted drug agreement, which I read, talks about the size and shape of the table. There are no specifics.
In view of this, I urge decertification with a waiver.